Dans un format court (entre 5 et 15 pages), les notes de recherche présentent les travaux de l'IRSEM et proposent des éléments d'analyse et de compréhension de grands enjeux stratégiques.
Note de recherche n°141 - 2024
"Big words, small deeds Russia and China in the Arctic"
Auteur : Lukas B. Wahden
Russia’s war against Ukraine has had a significant impact on the Arctic. Relations between Russia and the Arctic NATO states have deteriorated, the western Arctic states have ceased most institutional cooperation with Moscow, and the Arctic Council is paralysed. At the same time, climate change is changing the natural environment of the region. This has made it easier to extract and transport Arctic resources by sea. New Arctic shipping lanes are opening up, which is attracting military and naval powers to the High North. Russia has long focused on expanding its Arctic cooperation with China, especially in its attempts to reduce the impact of Western sanctions. Following its occupation of Crimea in 2014, Moscow could rely on Chinese investors to prop up its Arctic companies. However, since 2022, investments by Chinese partners have fallen short of Russia’s expectations. Military cooperation between Russia and China in the region has also been scarce. In light of China’s reticence to become more involved in its Arctic economy, Moscow has tried to diversify the range of its non-Arctic regional partners.
Note de recherche n°140 - 2024
"The Korean defense industry enters the European security theater an analysis of Korea-Poland arms deals"
Auteur : Wooyeal Paik
Over the past couple of years Korea and Poland have been advancing a large arms deal framework, worth approximately 60 billion USD, across the field including, but not limited to, main battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers, light fighter jets and multi-launch rocket systems. This is an unprecedented defense industrial cooperation to connect, if not integrate, their respective regions in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. Such a bold move surprises many in both regions as well as Russia and other major powers. Why and how did they confirm this intriguing defense industrial cooperation, which has significant implications for security alignment? What are the pros and cons of the ongoing interaction for these two geographically distant security partners? What are the strategic consequences and implications for Korea, Poland, and other major stakeholders? This paper provides a set of preliminary assessments of these issues.
Military lessons of the war in Ukraine are numerous and of great interest to Western armies. They affect all areas of conflict and are diverse and varied. Against this backdrop, this article looks in particular at the use of reservists by the two belligerents and seeks to draw some useful observations for our own defence models. Until the mid 2000s, the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces, both heirs to the Soviet model, had similar structures. Then these structures, and in particular the organisation, training and use of reservists diverged. The conflict that began in 2014 has accentuated these divergences, challenged the models chosen but also shown the importance of using reservists. Since 2014, but especially since 2022, both the Russians and the Ukrainians have had to adapt the way they employ their reservists in order to face the reality of war, with contrasting results. For their part, Western armies have been grappling since the end of the Cold War with the dilemma: mass or high technology? The question of this use of reservists in France and more widely in Western countries is no exception to this issue. First, this study describes the models in place and how they are evolving, then it analyses the use and results obtained by Ukrainian and Russian reservists in the context of the current conflict. Finally, in the light of these observations, this document proposes three main options for Western armies regarding the organisation and the use of their reservists.
On March 10, 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced that they had signed an agreement to resume their diplomatic relations. This agreement was concluded under the aegis of China – a resounding event that is bound to trigger a variety of political and economic upheavals in a strategic region that holds 40% of the world’s fossil fuel reserves. It also points to a transformation of the international system, with regional players increasing their autonomy and China playing a growing role on the international political stage. What assessments can be made about this new rapprochement between the region’s “two best enemies”? What does this situation say about Beijing’s evolving regional and international expectations? The present study shows that this tripartite agreement is of major importance to a variety of players in the region. Thus, it has been well received on an international level. This agreement is also the manifestation of the three protagonists’ shared economic interests. It points to a significant change in the political and strategic regional order.
In the fall of 2022, a Spanish NGO published a series of reports denouncing extra-territorial police practices by China. This raises the following question: does China implement international police and law inforcement cooperation? It appears that the People’s Republic of China – through its Ministry of Public Security – is extensively developing this type of cooperation, be it through institutional frameworks or by utilizing a variety of tools. Police and judicial cooperation is viewed as a “creative involvement” that allows Beijing to pursue both diplomatic and security-related objectives.
"MALI KURA, MALI FANGA THE POLITICAL TRAJECTORY OF MALI UNDER MILITARY RULE"
Author : Maxime Ricard
How did military dominance come about in Mali following the coups of 2020 and 2021? What shifts has the situation brought about in terms of civil-military relations? What effects have these political changes had on the economies of violence in the Sahel region? Beyond the reality of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s regime, we are seeing the results of the nation’s disillusionment at play, following the unfulfilled promises of the post-1991 democratic opening. Ten years after the 2012 coup, the rule of violence has been sustained by (counter)insurgency logics and has since escalated. This state of affairs helps us understand the population’s support for the coups in 2020 and 2021, based on the nation’s desire for a Mali Kura, a new Mali. The Mali Fanga, a war-waging narrative upheld by the military transitional government and which is presumed effective, explains the rationale underlying Mali’s response to its various crises. The current results of this approach boil down to the strengthening of authoritarianism, an exacerbation of the economies of violence and a strategic shift that counts on the unpopularity of France’s presence in the Sahel. After being waged for ten years, the “war on terror” in the Sahel region has had lasting effects and has only worsened the rule of violence. In a context marked by one-upmanship, the Malian transitional government and its martial approach are receiving support from Wagner, a Russian private military company. Thus, Mali’s current trajectory raises questions concerning the country’s socio-political order, the future of conflict resolution and the configuration of power in the long run.
"NATO’S ENHANCED FORWARD PRESENCE (EFP) IN THE BALTIC STATES AND POLAND"
Author : Amélie ZIMA
This paper analyzes the limits and assets of conventional deterrence by taking NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltic States and Poland as a case study. This research, based on a qualitative survey conducted at NATO headquarters, focuses on several aspects of the eFP: 1) the choice of a multinational format for this activity, which presents the challenge of interoperability; 2) the different roles of the battlegroups that are not limited to deterrence; 3) developments since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This paper shows that despite reservations about the heterogenous implementation of the eFP, NATO’s deterrence activity has received an overwhelming amount of support from several players: Central and Eastern European member states, which are thus leaving their status as second-tier members and seeing their security concerns considered, and partners who, as demonstrated by the accession process of Sweden and Finland, are looking for NATO’s protection.
"THE JAPANESE AND THEIR SELF-DEFENCE FORCES TODAY"
Author : Marjorie VANBAELINGHEM and Alice ORTEGA
Japan is currently the fifth largest conventional military power in the world, and yet it has no armed forces, since the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF), created after World War II, cannot be considered as such. This paper looks at this paradox from the perspective of the relationship of these forces to Japanese society and the way in which their image affects defence policy in Japan. To do so, we go back to the origins of the JSDF’s status and consider their characteristics and the current limits to their development. We also look at how their image, missions and prerogatives are out of step with the geostrategic context of 2022. The image of the JSDF in the eyes of the Japanese population proves to be the key to understanding the permanence of this paradoxical status. We thus analyze how this image is constructed through public opinion, official communication policy and the influence of external actors, such as the American armed forces.
"LOOKING BEYOND THE RHETORIC: REACTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TO AUKUS"
Author : Collin KOH
This paper surveys the reactions amongst ASEAN member states following the announcement of AUKUS. By “reactions”, this paper argues, one needs to look beyond the obvious rhetoric – such as those evinced by Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur immediately after the deal was publicized. Beyond rhetoric, “reactions” also encompass the less apparent policy actions which may subtly reflect the sentiments of ASEAN capitals to AUKUS. Such policy actions as the aforementioned elevation of ASEAN-Australia relations to one of comprehensive security partnership are arguably more decisive than mere open press statements or random remarks by ASEAN political elites and policy planners. Of course, this paper would not stop at surveying those reactions but attempts to underline the strategic rationale. It argues that Southeast Asian perceptions towards evolving geopolitical uncertainties in the region, including concerns over the rise and growing assertiveness of China, could have shaped sentiments towards AUKUS, manifested not only in words but through more tangible, albeit less obvious, policy actions.
"TRENDS IN LEGISLATION AGAINST FALSE AND HARMFUL INFORMATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC"
Author : Celine THAM
While “fake news” as a phenomenon is not new, today’s digital media age has made the need to address it considerably more urgent. Its political impact, potential to compromise the integrity of electoral processes, and ability to cause real world harm have driven governments across the globe to take notice. The trend towards legislation as a countermeasure is unmistakable, with many new pieces of regulation targeting the creation, distribution and manipulation of false and harmful information being enacted in the last four years, and many more still being drafted and considered. This note maps and compares the regulatory frameworks for addressing false and/or harmful information in five jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific – Australia, India, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan. Its aim is to demonstrate the diversity of regulatory strategies which have been implemented or are under consideration, and in doing so, act as a discussion starter on governance of the digital space, where the circulation of ideas could better inform the fight against false and harmful information, which spreads not just within but across national borders.
"EUROPEAN DEFENCE FUND BENEFICIARIES PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED AND OPEN QUESTIONS"
Author : Alain ALEXIS
By proposing the establishment of a European Defence Fund, the European Commission has, for the first time since 1957, decided to mobilise Community resources to support the development of the capabilities necessary for guaranteeing Europe’s security and developing its strategic autonomy. This initiative, launched prior to the invasion of Ukraine, takes on a new dimension in light of the war in Europe and the decision taken by the Member States at the European Council in Versailles to develop their defence capacity. It is also clear that this strengthening of European capacity is contributing to global security within NATO. The provisions of the European Defence Fund are fully consistent with this imperative: they allow companies located in Europe but controlled by third countries to benefit from Community support subject to certain conditions. They are also consistent with the Union’s security interests. The results of the calls for proposals for the first two years of the Fund demonstrate that the participation of companies controlled by third countries is indeed possible but their participation must be carefully verified by the Commission.
"EU’S PARADIGM SHIFT TOWARDS THE RISE OF CHINA"
Author : Earl WANG
This research paper explores how the European Union (EU) has been reacting to the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The paper presents the finding that since 2016 there have been discernible changes in the EU’s perception of China and its approach to the country, which is with growing assertiveness and even aggressiveness at times. The EU has been building up more tangible means to withstand the challenges posed by China. The EU-China – A Strategic Outlook document published in March 2019 is identified as the moment of the EU’s concrete paradigm shift towards Beijing.
"ARMIES ARE BACK IN TOWN. URBAN WARFARE AND THE METROPOLIZATION OF VIOLENCE"
Author : Florian OPILLARD
Since the 1980’s, a worldwide urbanization process has lead to the drastic rise in both the number of metropolises and their spatial imprint. Along with their generalization, inequalities and low intensity violence have both intensified. In some contexts such as Brazil or Mexico, their extent questions the traditional divide between a conventional and external use of military forces and their intervention in so called “internal wars”. Far from being a passive context of engagement, metropolises have become both epicenters of social violence, warfare targets and leveling environments for the military. Drawing from its experience in urban battles in recent years and flowing several regular armies, the French military has incorporated urban combat into its doctrines in an attempt to avoid the tactical trap metropolises represent. This research paper delineates these evolutions as well as their implications for military functions in several countries.
"KAZKHASTAN, JANUARY 2022: A STRATEGIC SURPRISE?"
Author : Col. Stéphan SAMARAN
The events that took place in Kazakhstan during the first two weeks of January came like a bolt out of the blue. The surprise was three-fold: first, the rapid transformation of peaceful demonstrations into violent riots; then the forceful regain of control by President Tokayev; and lastly, the unprecedented and effective intervention of a military contingent of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The end of the unrest is synonymous with reconstruction, reforms and consolidation of national unity.
The Covid-19 health and related economic crises did not leave any sector of the economy unharmed. Although it may not be the first in line, the defence industry has also been impacted. This paper explores the various impacts of the Covid-19 on the defence industry in Europe, both on the short and long-term dimensions. After exploring the immediate and longer-term impacts of the crisis for the defence industry, the paper concludes by discussing whether the crisis could be an opportunity for further European armament cooperation. This IRSEM publication is based on Dr Béraud-Sudreau’s personal research and does not relate to the SIPRI databases or annual data launches.
During Donald Trump’s presidency, US-Russia relations significantly worsened. On top of the tensions over the Ukrainian and Syrian crises, new ones have emerged in other areas, from arms control to geopolitical power politics in the “Greater Middle East”. Through an analysis of the main drivers of the relations between the US and Russia over the past four years, this paper explores how the US domestic polarization over how to deal with Russia resulted in ineffective sanctions, weakened cooperation on arms control, and ultimately allowed Russia to gain geopolitical room in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and to continue strengthening its ties with China. The first part of this paper retraces the evolution and polarization of the debate on Russia in the United States, while the second discusses how such trends have resulted in sanctions being the main US foreign policy tool towards Russia. After providing an overview of the impact of the standoff with Russia on arms control, this study shows how the US intervention fatigue has given Russia greater room for actions in the MENA region, but also how deteriorating relations between Moscow and Washington ultimately facilitated more solid relations between Moscow and Beijing. Lastly, this paper discusses the main challenges ahead in the bilateral relation in light of Joseph Biden’s recent election as president of the United States.
The mobilization of armed forces in the management of the health crisis linked to Covid-19 is part of the fight against the pandemic. In Europe, the States requested them mainly for logistical and medical support, but in some countries, they also participated in public security tasks, such as maintenance of order or border control. This note presents an initial overview of the missions they have undertaken among civilian populations by comparing the nature of the interventions carried out, the number of personnel deployed, and the scale of operations in France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and the United States. In recent times, the scope of missions carried out by the armed forces has undeniably widened and they must regularly provide their support and skills in situations of natural, humanitarian and health disasters, in support of civilian resources. The Covid-19 pandemic is a new illustration of this evolution.
The dramatic increase in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe has heightened EU security concerns. Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 is a response to those concerns. The Regulation is a framework for the coordination of and communication between Member States on the issue of FDI screening. While the Regulation does not require that Member States adopt FDI screening mechanisms or amend existing mechanisms, it enjoins Member States to keep the Union apprised of incoming FDI and provides other Member States and the Commission with the opportunity to raise their concerns regarding specific FDI transactions that may threaten security or public order in the Union. The premise underlying the Regulation is that greater awareness of the security risks in certain incoming FDI will prompt Member States to react—by blocking the incoming FDI and,in the longer term, bolstering their own domestic screening legislation.
This paper provides an overview of the Regulation and its proposed cooperation mechanisms. It further provides a comparison between the Regulation and the CFIUS framework in the United States. Finally, this paper considers the effectiveness of the Regulation in light of the changed security and economic context brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic.
During the fall of 2019, major demonstrations broke out in the largest Iraqi cities, challenging both the Iraqi government and Iran. Meanwhile, several militias strove to counter the popular movement by heightening tensions against American interests. They conducted a wide range of operations: show of force, repression campaign, harassment of US military camps, etc. They proved extensive irregular warfare capabilities. Gradually, their actions scaled up and ended up prompting a massive reaction from Washington (elimination of General Soleimani). Against any odds, the assassination had favorable consequences for Iran: demonstrations lost their popular support and weakened, while Western military forces started pulling out. This huge strategic benefit may be a hint that these militias have been activated to carry out a sophisticated operation plan. Eventually, they engineered considerable outcomes from a rather weak initial investment. As such, they appear as a powerful tool of strategic leverage that can be activated remotely.
The noticeable growth in the use of assassination as a political tool poses important questions about the role and limits of covert actions in international relations. These operations, located at the high end of the spectrum of capacities of intelligence services, constitute one of the most significant violations both of the national sovereignty of the country where an assassination takes place and of the most fundamental rights of individuals. This note examines six assassinations, sponsored by democratic or authoritarian regimes since 2010, with the goal of improving our understanding of the reasons for their use. Our analysis shows that even though intelligence services cannot always ensure the secrecy of these operations, their covert nature nevertheless provide their sponsors with a form of deniability. The majority of political and diplomatic costs born of the assassinations examined here seem to fade in time and therefore are negligible from the point of view of a political decision-maker. Given these conditions, we conclude that the use of assassination as a political tool is likely to become more widespread in the coming years.
Russia uses a variety of methods to influence its former Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Since its conquest of the region in the 19th Century, Russia considers Transcaucasia particularly important for its geopolitical standing. No longer able to persuade or attract South Caucasus populations, Russia’s strategy of influence is largely based on military power (hard power). It struggles to develop its soft power in this region, resorting finally to more coercive methods like exploiting: conflicts in the secessionist regions of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia; Kremlin-affiliated oligarchs; and energy prices. This traps Russia in a vicious cycle: to retain its influence in the South Caucasus, it becomes increasingly coercive and aggressive, appearing malevolent to local populations. The Kremlin relies on well-known and established strategies in the South Caucasus, making it an important case study in the analysis of Russian foreign policy in general.
The emergence of a bipolar world dominated by US-China competition will be one of the most crucial factors shaping global security in the years to come. This evolution will be particularly challenging for Europe and transatlantic relations. In the event of a US-China confrontation, Europeans would face increasing responsibility because the US would need to focus on the East Asian theatre; in the case of a bipolar détente, the US might want to cooperate increasingly with China, possibly at the expense of the transatlantic partnership. With a view to being better prepared for those risks, Europeans should develop their strategic autonomy, reinforce their economic sovereignty and restore their naval power.
On July 24th , 2019, China published its tenth Defense White Paper. Far from announcing an evolution of the Chinese military strategy, “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (新时代的中国国防) has two core functions: taking steps toward increased transparency by explaining how China perceives its regional and global environment; and halting the spread of the Chinese threat theory that fuels an increasingly virulent opposition towards China. However, China is struggling to convince on these two points: questionable interpretation of international tensions and partial analysis of the implications, lack of recognition of substantive problems, half-hearted transparency incapable of responding to the concerns of Beijing’s interlocutors. A critical reading of this document makes it possible to identify the main perceptions of the ruling elite.
"SHIITE MILITIAS AND THE STATE IN IRAQ. Between integration an empowerment"
Authors: Flavien BOURRAT, Alexandre d’ESPINOSE DE LACAILLERIE
A new type of militia is currently spreading in the Arab world, and in particular in Iraq. While this phenomenon has deep roots, it is the result of the weakening of the central state and the withering of the military and security apparatus. The growth in power of the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (Hashd Sha’abi), initially intended to be the tip of the spear in the fight against the Islamic State, calls into question their institutional status and remit, even though their mission has been successfully completed. Now the question of their integration or their demobilisation arises. The increasing fear in Iraq, as well as the region as a whole, of the prospect of a permanent parallel Shiite army, serving Iranian interests, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, should be qualified. In reality, the specific attributes of the Iraqi Shiite community and its political and security representation, greatly limit the possibility of these militias being instrumentalised by Tehran.
"INTELLIGENCE STUDIES IN FRANCE. History, Structure and Proposals"
Authers : Jean-Vincent HOLEINDRE, Benjamin OUDET
Since the September 11 attacks, there has been a threefold legitimization of the intelligence field in France: due to the international context, through contemporary security challenges such as terrorism, organized crime, information manipulation; and the subsequent shift in public policies (leading in particular to the Intelligence Act of July 24th, 2015); and by the changing perception of a public affected by the terrorist threat. This context can encourage the development of intelligence studies, which has so far struggled to establish itself in France. The subject is indeed being considered in an increasing number of works in the humanities and social sciences, especially in history, law and political science. This paper reviews intelligence studies in France, without claiming to establish an exhaustive map of the field. It is organized into three sections: first, a brief history of intelligence studies through the comparison of the Anglo-American world and France. Data on the structure of the field (publications, theses, research networks, internationalization) will then be presented. Finally, ten proposals are made for the development of intelligence studies, particularly in terms of teaching, clearances granted to researchers, and the creation of a specialized journal. We also advocate a rapprochement between academics and professionals, carried out with strict respect for the independence of the spheres and with concern for mutual understanding. In this regard, the role of the State and public authorities is fundamental in overseeing and giving momentum to this rapprochement.
"THE DEBATE ON UNIVERSAL NATIONAL SERVICE: BETWEEN POLITICAL WILL AND PUBLIC CONFUSION"
Author: Bénédicte CHÉRON
For the first time since compulsory national service was suspended in 2001, decided in 1997, the French people have elected a president who proposes re-establishing a form of universal and compulsory service. The announcement by Emmanuel Macron caused a major stir during the election campaign. However, it was only the latest contribution to a long debate on how to mobilise young people for the good of society. It also corresponded to an increasingly apparent political concern for national cohesion and unity. It became explicit during the 2007 election campaign, marked by the memory of the recent 2005 urban riots, and now made omnipresent by the 2015 terrorist attacks. The debate was intended to implement this new national service. However, since the presidential campaign, it has instead revealed public confusion about the pre-2001 national service, as well as the difficulty of identifying the role that the armed forces – now fully professionalised – could play. This paper aims to explore this debate and resituate it in the context of the recurring discussions in French politics since 1997, as well as in the long-term perspective of France’s collective mindset. It will also examine how this idea is taking form at the European level.
"A EUROPEAN DRONE SPACE"
Authors: Chantal LAVALLÉE, Océane ZUBELDIA
The massive military potential offered by drones has placed them at the heart of modern militaries. Their incontrovertible strategic benefits have prompted several European states to pursue the joint development of a Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) drone. It is an ambitious challenge, thus cooperative development is necessary to share the substantial investment costs and compete with the United States and Israel. Although military drone cooperation has progressed slowly in Europe, recent civilian drone initiatives may spark new momentum and stimulate civilian-military synergy. In order to manage the risks and take advantage of potential opportunities, there is a new political impulse in Europe to regulate the use and development of civilian drones. The goal is to integrate them into European airspace, with adapted regulations, research funding and a common market that will place Europe in strong position in this highly competitive sector. This research paper seeks to evaluate the nature and scope of current discussions and initiatives concerning the use of civilian and military drones in the European Union.